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Abstract
Two common and plausible claims in the philosophy of science are that (i) a theory
that makes no predictions is not testable and (ii) one cannot confirm a theory by crit-
icizing a competing one absent further assumptions about their relation. Elliott Sober
has developed these claims within likelihoodism, which defines the testability and con-
firmation of a theory only in contrast to another, and has argued that the claims hold
for intelligent design (ID) when contrasted with evolutionary theory (ET). I show that
Sober’s arguments rely on a contentious hidden premise, and that within likelihoodism,
both claims are false for ID and ET under his assumptions and one very weak further
assumption about ID and ET. I then show that, given Sober’s assumptions, the claims
are true for a non-contrastive criterion of testability close to the Bayesian one and the
relevance criterion of confirmation.
§1. Introduction. Likelihoodism as defended, for instance, by Sober (1990; 2008) and Roy-
all (1997) defines the testing (confirmation and disconfirmation) of a theory only in contrast
to another theory. On its own, likelihoodism therefore requires a fundamental revision of all
concepts that rely on confirmation or testing and are commonly not defined contrastively,
such as the notion of testability (§3). Likelihoodism therefore also requires the modification
of claims that rely on these concepts, including the common and plausible claims that (i) a
theory that does not make predictions is not testable and (ii) a theory cannot be confirmed
by criticizing a competing theory, absent further assumptions about the theories’ relation
(reviewed in §2). Over the last decade, Sober (1999; 2007; 2008) has argued convincingly that
intelligent design (ID), the theory that all complex adaptations of organisms are created by
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a designer, makes no predictions.1 Therefore, he argues, claims (i) and (ii) are true within
likelihoodism when ID is contrasted with evolutionary theory (ET) (§4). I will show (§5)
that Sober’s arguments rest on a contentious hidden premise and that under one very weak
assumption about ID and ET, both claims are false in likelihoodism. Since both claims are at
the core of Sober’s criticism of ID and are generally plausible in their own right, this provides
a strong reason to abandon the contrastive definitions of testability and confirmation in favor
of two non-contrastive ones, under which the claims are true.
§2. Testability and confirmation in Bayesianism. Claims (i) and (ii) are easily proved
within Bayesianism, a very common conception of confirmation that Sober (2008, §1.2) dis-
cusses but ultimately rejects. Here, the confirmation of a theory H by an observation O
relative to suitable auxiliary assumptions A is defined as follows (Howson and Urbach 1993,
§7a; Sober 2008, 15):
Definition (I). Observation O confirms H relative to A if and only if
Pr(H |O ∧A)> Pr(H |A) . (1)
For H to be actually confirmed, O has to be true. Here and in the following the auxiliary
assumptions must be included because “hypotheses rarely make observational predictions on
their own” (Sober 1999, 54). H is then tested by O if and only if Pr(H |O ∧A) 6= Pr(H |A).
It is clear that claim (ii) holds, since no competing theory H ′ occurs in definition (I). For
a criticism of H ′ to confirm H , one would need at least the further assumption that for some
observation O, Pr(H ′ |O ∧A)< Pr(H ′ |A) only if Pr(H |O ∧A)< Pr(H |A). This would be
the case, for instance, if the auxiliary assumptions A were such that H and H ′ are the only
plausible competing theories.
Sober (1999, 48) states for any relation R:
If a set of observations provides a test of a proposition because it bears relation
R to that proposition, then a proposition is testable when it is possible for there
to be a set of observations that bears relation R to the proposition. Testing is to
testability as dissolving is to solubility.
Since definition (I) determines what it is to test a theory, it therefore also determines a crite-
rion of testability (cf. Sober 2008, 150)2:
1In fact, Sober (2007, 3) defines ID as the theory that the complex adaptations of organisms are created by a
designer. Implicitly relying on Russell’s explication of the definite article, he then claims that ID does predict the
existence of complex adaptations. Since this sole prediction occurs for any theory whatsoever that purports to
give a cause for “the” adaptations, and since the prediction disappears when the definite article is exchanged for
a universal quantifier or explicated following Strawson, I consider it an artifact. In the discussion that follows, it
would only necessitate that claim (i) be rephrased to exclude this particular prediction.
2Sober (2008, 144f) does not mention auxiliary assumptions in his discussion (and rejection) of the definition,
but is very explicit about their relevance.
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Definition (II). H can be tested relative to A if and only if there is a possible observation O
such that
Pr(H |O ∧A) 6= Pr(H |A) . (2)
Sober now states that a theory makes predictions “either by deductively entailing that an
observation will occur or by conferring a probability on an observational outcome” (Sober
2008, 130). Formally, Sober (2008, 151) defines for deductive predictions relative to A that
proposition P “has observational implications if and only if there exist[s an] observation
statement O, such that [ . . . ] P & A entails O, but A by itself does not entail O”. Sober does
not give a formalization for probabilistic predictions; I suggest
Definition (III). H makes probabilistic predictions relative to A if and only if there is a
possible observation O such that
Pr(O |H ∧A) 6= Pr(O |A) . (3)
According to this definition, a theory H makes probabilistic predictions if and only if
there exist a value p and an observation statement O such that H ∧A confers p on O, but
A by itself does not confer p on O. This nicely captures Sober’s informal formulation given
above. It is furthermore easily shown that according to definition (III), H does not make any
probabilistic predictions if and only if it makes the same probabilistic predictions as a tau-
tology (which makes none).3 Finally, this definition contains Sober’s definition of deductive
predictions as a special case (Lutz 2011b, claim 8).
Claim (i) now follows from Bayes’s theorem,
Pr(H |O ∧A)
Pr(H |A) =
Pr(O |H ∧A)
Pr(O |A) , (4)
since one can easily prove that a theory is testable according to definition (II) if and only if it
makes probabilistic predictions according to definition (III).
§3. Contrastive testability and confirmation. Sober (2008, 24–30, 150) eschews both
Bayesian confirmation (definition (I)) and Bayesian testability (definition (II)) because they
rely on the assignment of probabilities to whole theories. Instead, he suggests to define con-
firmation contrastively (Sober 2008, 32):
Definition (IV). Observation O favors hypothesis H1 over hypothesis H2 relative to A if
and only if
Pr(O |H1 ∧A)> Pr(O |H2 ∧A) . (5)
3Two theories H1 and H2 make the same probabilistic predictions given A if and only if for all observations
O, Pr(O |H1 ∧A) = Pr(O |H2 ∧A). It is clear that tautologies do not make any probabilistic predictions, since
adding a tautology to any set of sentences with a set of possible probability distributions will not further restrict
the latter set.
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The terms in the inequality are called the likelihoods of H1 and H2 (for O), from which
this approach derives its name ‘likelihoodism’. Through the relations between confirmation,
testing, and testability, definition (IV) determines testability (Sober 2008, 152):
Definition (V). H1 can be tested against H2 relative to A if and only if there is a possible
observation O such that
Pr(O |H1 ∧A) 6= Pr(O |H2 ∧A) . (6)
For the purposes of definition (V), Sober (2010, 2f) considers the inequality (6) true if and
only if both likelihoods are defined and different (cf. Lutz 2011a, §3.1). Since inequality (5)
entails inequality (6) and definition (IV) determines definition (V), inequality (5) is also true
only if both likelihoods are defined.
According to Sober (2008, 37), likelihoodism does not require a fundamental revision of
the common notions of confirmation and testability. Rather, likelihoodism “emerges as a
statistical philosophy distinct from Bayesianism only when [it] is not possible” to “assign
probabilities to hypotheses [ . . . ] by appeal to empirical information”. However, this alleged
continuity with Bayesianism has been questioned both for contrastive confirmation (Fitelson
2007) and contrastive testability (Lutz 2011b, §4) on formal grounds.
§4. Testability and confirmation of ID against ET. The core of Sober’s application of
the likelihood approach to the debate about ID (1999, 62ff; 2007, 6; 2008, §2.12, §2.15) is a
convincing case for the claim that ID does not make any predictions because it is impossible
to know the designer’s intentions. From this he concludes that ID “cannot be tested against
evolutionary theory” (Sober 1999, 64). That ID is not testable is also a common position
outside of likelihoodism (cf. Gould 1983, 256), and an instance of claim (i).
To show that within likelihoodism, claim (ii) applies to ID when it is contrasted with ET,
Sober (2007, 7) argues as follows:
Defenders of ID often claim to test their position [ . . . ] by criticizing the theory
of evolution. Behe (1996) contends that evolutionary processes cannot produce
“irreducibly complex” adaptations; since we observe such traits, evolutionary
theory is refuted, leaving ID as the only position standing. [T]his argument does
nothing to test ID. For ID to be testable, it must make predictions. The fact that
a different theory makes a prediction says nothing about whether ID is testable.
Going from bottom to top, Sober’s argument amounts to the following: Since ID does not
make predictions, it is not testable. Therefore, it is not tested by observations of irreducibly
complex adaptations (this is a trivial proof given definitions (V) and (IV)). Hence ID is not
confirmed by them. Note also that Sober here assumes that ET makes predictions. Elsewhere,
Sober (1999, 66f) points out that there may be other theories besides ID which predict traits
that are improbable according to ET, and continues:
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[T]he defect in this argument that I’m now pointing to is different. [ . . . ] The
worst-case scenario for Darwinism is that the theory, with appropriate auxiliary
assumptions, entails that what we observe was very improbable. However, this,
by itself, isn’t enough to reject Darwinism and opt for the hypothesis of intelli-
gent design. We need to know how probable it is that the features would exist, if
they were the result of intelligent design. Both hypotheses must make predictions
if the observations are to help us choose between them.
Sober here directly infers that because ID does not make predictions, a trait that is improbable
according to ET does not test, and therefore also does not confirm, ID. That a low likelihood
of ET cannot confirm ID is also a common position outside of likelihoodism (cf. Pennock
2011, 188), and an instance of claim (ii). Note that outside of likelihoodism, this instance of
claim (ii) does not rely on any specific feature of ID itself. To establish the claim for ID in
contrast to ET, on the other hand, Sober’s argument relies on the premise that ID does not
make predictions.
§5. The failure of likelihoodism. I will now show that Sober’s application of the likeli-
hood approach to the debate about ID and ET not only fails, but also provides support for
two alternative, non-contrastive conceptions of testability and confirmation.
Sober’s arguments for claims (i) and (ii) about ID and ET have a hidden premise. By
assumption, ID does not makes predictions, so that Pr(O | ID∧A) = Pr(O |A) whenever both
probabilities are defined. Furthermore, it follows from claim (i) that inequality (6) is false for
every O, and thus Pr(O |ET ∧A) = Pr(O | ID ∧A) whenever both probabilities are defined.
Therefore, for any O such that Pr(O |ET ∧A) 6= Pr(O |A) and both probabilities are defined,
Pr(O | ID ∧A) must be undefined. This same hidden premise also follows from the premise
that ID makes no predictions and claim (ii), that a low likelihood of ET cannot confirm ID.
For if Pr(O |ET∧A)< Pr(O |A), then Pr(¬O |ET∧A)> Pr(¬O |A), and thus no matter the
value of ET’s likelihood, it is possible that ID is confirmed in contrast to ET unless the hidden
premise is fulfilled. The premise is thus necessary for both of Sober’s arguments to be valid.
It is easy to see that it is also sufficient.
However, contrary to the hidden premise, it is plausible that for a theory H that makes no
predictions, Pr(O |H ∧A) is defined whenever Pr(O |A) is defined. For if Pr(O |A) is defined,
then, given A, one must expect a specific regularity of occurrences of O. But if Pr(O |H ∧A)
is undefined, one must expect a breakdown of this regularity, and this expectation is plausibly
a prediction. An example would be the prediction that under specific circumstances, some
law fails that was assumed to hold universally.
That Pr(O | ID∧A) is at least sometimes defined when Pr(O |A) is defined follows from an
example given by Sober (1999, n. 24) himself:
Let H1 = God created the eye, E = Jones is pregnant, A = Jones is sexually
active, and H2 = Jones used birth control. It is possible to test H1 against H2;
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given independently attested background assumptions A, E favors H1 over H2.
The reason is that Pr(E |A) = Pr(E |A & H1)> Pr(E |A & H2).
Since for Sober (1999, 62, 65), H1 here stands for ID, Pr(O | ID ∧A) is defined for some ob-
servation O, for example that Jones is pregnant. It is thus not clear why, for all O with
Pr(O |ET∧A) 6= Pr(O |A), ID should render the probability for O undefined.
ET makes predictions, and, more specifically, there are many O∗ such that Pr(O∗ |ET ∧
A) 6= Pr(O∗ |A) and both probabilities are defined. Given the preceding considerations, it
is very plausible that at least for one such O∗, Pr(O∗ | ID ∧ A) is defined. This very weak
assumption is also independently plausible: Take the statement that the eye of some organism
has a specific feature. Based on our background knowledge about the ratio of the occurrence
of this feature in other organisms’ eyes, we might be able to assign a specific probability p to
the occurrence of this feature, and based on our background knowledge and ET, we might be
able to assign a different probability. But based on our background knowledge, we can also
infer that if that eye was created by a designer, this designer had the intention and ability to
create an eye with that feature with probability p. In conjunction with ID, the probability
for the occurrence of the feature then does not become undefined, but rather keeps the value
p.
Under this very weak assumption, claim (i) is false for ID and ET within likelihoodism.
For then Pr(O∗ |ET ∧A) 6= Pr(O∗ |A) = Pr(O∗ | ID ∧A), where all probabilities are defined,
so that ID can be tested against ET. It is also easy to prove that the observation O∗ favors
ID over ET according to definition (IV) if and only if Pr(O∗ |ET ∧ A) < Pr(O∗ |A). Thus
the real worst-case scenario for ET is that it assigns a true observation statement O∗ a lower
probability than the auxiliary assumptions alone. And if Behe were to prove this for some
true O∗, he would thereby show that ID is contrastively confirmed. Therefore claim (ii) is
also false for ID and ET within likelihoodism.
This argument can be repeated for any two theories that fulfill the very weak assumption:
a tautologous theory contrasted with quantum physics, for instance, or the nonsense theory
‘Foo is bar’ contrasted with plate tectonics. But the important conclusion is not that ID
and analogous theories are contrastively testable and could be contrastively confirmed by
discovering some low likelihood of ET or analogous theories. For Sober’s criticisms of ID
are the common and plausible ones: ID does not make predictions and therefore cannot be
tested nor confirmed. The above considerations only show that Sober’s expression of these
criticisms in terms of contrastive testability and contrastive confirmation is inconsistent with
his premises and a very weak assumption about ID and ET.
It is a severe criticism to charge that a theory does not make predictions, because it means
that the theory only asserts observation statements or probabilities for observation state-
ments that are already expected independently of the theory. But to make this point, defi-
nition (V) is not needed; definition (III) already captures Sober’s criticism. Definition (III)
is also a good candidate for a criterion of testability: Arguably unlike contrastive testabil-
ity, it is continuous with Bayesian testability (because claim (i) holds for Bayesianism). And
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since it does not require assigning probabilities to whole theories, it is immune from Sober’s
criticism of Bayesianism.
Because of the relation between testability and testing, the use of definition (III) as crite-
rion of testability entails that an observation O tests H relative to A if and only if Pr(O |H ∧
A) 6= Pr(O |A). This allows for two definitions of confirmation (one with a ‘less-than’, one
with a ‘greater-than’ sign), one of which is, arguably unlike contrastive confirmation, contin-
uous with Bayesian confirmation:
Definition (VI). Observation O confirms H relative to A if and only if
Pr(O |H ∧A)> Pr(O |A) . (7)
This definition is equivalent to the Bayesian definition (I) whenever the theory can be as-
signed a probability, but, like Sober’s definition (IV), does not presume that this is possible.
It has also frequently been defended as a criterion of confirmation (cf. Mackie 1969).
With definition (III) as a criterion of testability and with definition (VI), claims (i) and
(ii) are indeed true if ID does not make predictions. That the two definitions stay close
to the common concepts of testability and confirmation is an additional advantage. For the
contrastive concepts demand such fundamental revision in the conceptualization of common
claims that even proponents of likelihoodism can be led into inconsistency.
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